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The control of renewable energy communities with controllable assets
(e.g., batteries) can be formalised as a decision process. This paper pro-
poses a generic formulation for such a problem whereby the electricity
generated by the community members is redistributed using repartition
keys. These keys represent the fraction of the surplus of local electricity
production (i.e., electricity generated but not consumed by any commu-
nity member) to be allocated to each community member. This formali-
sation allows to jointly optimise the controllable assets and the repartition
keys in order to minimise the sum of the electricity bills of the commu-
nity members, as opposed to common practices in the literature which
only optimise one of them. To perform this optimisation, we propose
two algorithms aimed to solve an optimal open-loop control problem in
a receding horizon fashion. Moreover, we also propose another approxi-
mated algorithm which only optimises the controllable assets (as opposed
to optimising both controllable assets and repartition keys). We test these
algorithms on renewable energy community control problems built from
synthetic data. Our results show that the sum of the electricity bills
of the members is greatly reduced when simultaneously optimising the
controllable assets and the repartition keys (i.e., the first two algorithms
proposed). These findings strongly advocate the need for algorithms that
take a more holistic standpoint when it comes to controlling energy sys-
tems such as renewable energy communities, co-optimising or jointly op-
timising them from both a traditional (very granular) control standpoint




I Set of REC members
S State space
U Action space
Ξ Exogenous variable space
State variables
sci State variable that gathers information about controllable assets
of member i of the community
sτ Elapsed number of time steps of the current metering period
se−i Quantity of net energy consumed by member i during the current
metering period
se+i Quantity of net energy produced by member i during the current
metering period
Action variables
uci Action related to the control of controllable assets of member i
uk+[i] Repartition key for member i that determines the share of the sur-
plus of local electricity production to allocate as local production
uk−[i] Repartition key that determines the share of the surplus of local
electricity production to allocate to member i
Exogenous variables
ebi,t Vector of buying prices for the metering period Mt
esi,t Vector of selling prices for the metering period Mt
eoi,t Vector of other exogenous variables for the metering period Mt
Other variables and parameters
Φ Local production surplus to be reallocated to the REC membersC
ρoi Operational costs related to member i
ρe Sum of energy bills of the members
K Policy horizon
Mt Metering period corresponding to a discrete time step t
∆M Number of time steps in a metering period
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1 Introduction
Decarbonising the electricity generation sector is currently one of the primary
goals towards curbing anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases. To that
end, various energy policies around the world have set out to provide guidelines
and pathways toward achieving this goal [1, 2, 3, 4]. A key enabler of the de-
carbonisation is the decentralisation of the power generation, which allows for
the electricity to be generated closer to where it is consumed. The production
assets are, in this case, typically small, such as solar photovoltaic (PV) panels,
and are directly connected to the distribution networks. This decentralisation
does not come, nonetheless, without challenges. Several technical as well as
regulatory challenges emerge when a significant proportion of the electricity
consumed by final customers is produced near or at the consumption centres
(e.g., by prosumers) as addressed in [5]. These problems exist due, among other
reasons, to the lack of regulatory frameworks defining how the electricity can
be traded in decentralised settings. In this regard, various trading alternatives
have been studied in the existing literature, the most relevant ones based on
peer-to-peer (P2P) electricity trading and on trading via a centralised entity.
Concerning the first one (P2P trading), a substantial amount of research already
exists, for instance these two literature reviews, [6, 7], which encapsulate the
abundant existing works in the context of these types of exchange. The former
deals with P2P mechanisms using game-theoretical approaches, whilst the lat-
ter provides a motivation for the existence of these markets, exposing several
challenges, market designs, and potential future developments in this field. As
for trading through a central entity, the literature is less abundant and focuses
mainly on aggregator or retailer models (see for instance [8]). Over the last few
years though, a new concept has entered the arena: the renewable energy com-
munity (REC). On that account, some works can be found where the control
of consumption and production of consumers inside an REC is computed (see
[9, 10, 11]). However, the lack of adequate regulation has made it difficult to
apply any of those mechanisms in practice.
In an effort to provide a framework to boost these new decentralised mar-
kets, the European Commission in the latest Energy Package has embraced the
concept of REC and has introduced, for the first time, a formal definition of
these communities along with some basic working principles [2]. According to
this definition, RECs constitute a type of consumer-centric electricity market
comprised of consumers, prosumers, and generation and storage assets that may
be shared by all or a subset of the REC members. In this context, electricity
surplus generated from prosumers and reinjected into the network can be al-
located to the community and shared among the REC members. Therefore, a
fraction of the total electricity surplus can be allocated to each REC member
at a lower price than the retail one. In this paper, this surplus is denoted as
local production surplus. As per European regulation, RECs are managed by a
central entity: the energy community manager (ECM), whose responsibilities
include ensuring the adequate functioning of the REC. Although the rules of
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participation in an REC are precisely outlined in this European regulation1,
there is no provision dictating how to share the local production surplus within
the REC. To date and to the best of our knowledge, little or no research has
addressed the issue of performing the control of generation and storage devices
within an REC context, as further explained in Section 2.
To fill this gap, the main contribution of this paper consists in providing a
new methodology to control, in an optimal manner, the generation and storage
devices of RECs simultaneously with the allocation of the local production sur-
plus to the REC members. Our methodology provides a generic formulation of
the decision process associated to the control of RECs, one sufficiently flexible
to work with any composition of REC and to the specific rules applying to it.
This decision process, for which the formulation is detailed in Section 3, de-
scribes the dynamics of the controllable assets of each member (e.g., batteries),
as well as the distribution of local production surplus among the REC members.
To that end, it exploits the concept of repartition keys, which are introduced in
[12]. The repartition keys represent the fraction of the total production surplus
which is allocated to each REC member – there is one key per member and
time-step of the simulation. These keys are computed in the framework of our
decision process. Along with the decision process, we propose two algorithms,
described in Section 4, which directly exploit the specification of the decision
process itself to jointly optimise the control of the controllable assets and the
repartition keys in a finite time window. The goal of these algorithms is to
jointly minimise the cost related to the controllable assets and the cost of the
electricity bills that depend on the repartition keys (e.g., the sum of the electric-
ity bills of the members after allocating the local production surplus to the REC
members). Then, a test case is provided in Section 5, where an REC is built
from synthetic data – the two algorithms described in the previous section are
here benchmarked against a third one, that does not optimise the repartition
keys, illustrating the relevance of jointly optimising the repartition keys when
controlling RECs. Finally, Section 6 concludes this paper.
2 Related work
Although the exact rules defining how to exploit and control RECs are still under
elaboration, as seen in [2, 13, 14, 15, 16] research in this topic is already gath-
ering momentum. The literature on these control problems is, by and large,
scarce, and typically focuses on single-entity problems where a unique agent
(i.e., a single final customer such as a microgrid) is optimised with respect to
some objective, usually a cost minimisation. In this regard, model predictive
control approaches, based on mixed integer linear programming (MILP) or dy-
namic programming (DP), have been used to optimise the control of microgrids.,
which can be seen as a particular case of RECs with a single member. In [17],
the authors present an MILP as a solution to perform online planning in a mi-
1According to the latest European regulation, any final customer –consumer or prosumer–
may participate in an REC without loosing the previous status.
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crogrid with the goal of minimising the sum of the operational costs (related to
electricity exchanges with the main network), and some penalties related to the
usage of complex devices (e.g., energy generator with start up and shut down
commands). Similarly, in [18], linear programming techniques are employed to
optimise the control of microgrids by balancing the usage of short-term and
long-term storage systems in order to minimise the levelised cost of electricity
generated by the microgrid control. In [19] the authors propose an algorithm
based on DP and empirical mean to control a microgrid under stochastic scenar-
ios of wind turbine production so as to maximise the local consumption. In [20],
the authors propose a bi-level optimisation scheme, in a receding time horizon to
control a microgrid comprising a battery, a microturbine, a PV system and and
a load. In their work, an optimal daily planning of each controllable component
of the microgrid is computed at a time scale of 15 minutes. Then, a lower-level
controller adjusts the control of the microgrid to be as close as the optimal
daily plan as possible while respecting the real-time operational constraints.
The optimal control of microgrids can be achieved with other techniques, like
reinforcement learning (RL) algorithms, which often do not require to assume
the knowledge of the dynamics of the microgrids. In [21], the authors propose
to train deep neural networks using an RL algorithm known as Q-learning (see
[22]) by exploiting historical data of production and consumption in order to
sample control trajectories. Another work using RL, [23], benchmarks several
deep reinforcement learning algorithms against a microgrid with flexible de-
mand. In [24], the authors propose to use Deep Q-Learning to build a policy
that controls a microgrid which places orders in a continuous real-time market
while taking into account operational constraints.
With respect to the control of multi-entity problems, such as the REC, the
prevailing literature covers to a very limited extent these decision processes.
Some works exist, though, focusing on specific REC structures. For instance,
in [25] the authors adapt the Q-learning algorithm to train an autonomous
centralised controller with the objective of minimising the sum of the electricity
bills within a REC composed of buildings (members) that are equipped with
batteries and PV panels. In [26], a multi-agent deep reinforcement learning
algorithm, previously developed in [27], is employed to train each member of
the REC to cooperate in order to minimise the energy imported from the main
network, that is, the proportion of the REC consumption that is not covered by
local generation.
3 Decision Process associated to Renewable En-
ergy Communities
This section explains in detail the modelling framework proposed in our work,
formalising the decision process associated to RECs. This decision process aims
to control the dynamics of the electricity consumption and production of the























Figure 1: Illustration of a REC. To each member i ∈ {1, . . . , N} is associated
a consumption meter (C) and a production meter (P). At each discrete time
step t, these meters are incremented by the consumption and the production
of each member during the time interval (t, t + 1], respectively. These meters
are monitored at each end of metering period by an energy management system
(EMS). The EMS computes optimal repartition keys with the values monitored
from all the meters of the REC members and send them to their respective
retailers. Retailers periodically (e.g., monthly) compute the electricity bills
of each REC members based on the repartition keys and send them to their
respective customers.
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member is characterised by (i) a non-flexible electricity consumption,(ii) a non-
controllable electricity production with e.g., PV panels or wind turbines, and
(iii) a controllable electricity consumption/production with storage devices such
as batteries or hydrogen tanks equipped with fuel cells and electrolysers. Peri-
odically (e.g., each month), REC members are billed for their electricity con-
sumption depending on their metered consumption/production. According to
the last European regulation [2], the electricity surplus of an REC member can
either be sold to other REC members or be injected into the main grid via sales
to the retailer. On the other hand, the consumption of REC members may be
covered first with their own production (if they are prosumers), with the surplus
of other REC members via the local REC market, or through a traditional re-
tailer contract. In the context of RECs as described in [2], the ECM of the REC
is in charge of allocating the local electricity surplus among the REC members.
This allocation of the local production surplus can be performed according to
different objectives such as the minimisation of the sum of the REC members’
electricity bills. To that end, we introduce a methodology of local electricity
allocation based on a sequential decision making optimisation framework. This
methodology is based on repartition keys, as they are described in [12]. For each
member, a repartition key is defined by two values: the first one, namely the
export key, determines the fraction each member’s own production surplus to
be sold in the internal market of the REC, whereas the second one, the import
key, determines the fraction of the total local production surplus to be allocated
to each member. An illustration of the REC design used in our decision process
can be found in Figure 1.
3.1 Mathematical formulation of the decision process
The decision process introduced previously can be formalised as a discrete-time
dynamical system with a finite time horizon T . Within this dynamical system
denoted by D, we can identify the state, action, and exogenous spaces of the
dynamical system as:
• S denotes its state space and describes the state space of this system i.e.,
the information describing it;
• U denotes its action space and comprises the actions that steer the tran-
sitions from one step to the next;
• Ξ denotes its exogenous space and is composed of the exogenous values
with non-observable dynamics to which dynamical system associated to
RECs are typically subject (e.g., PV panel production).
With these spaces, we can define the dynamics, denoted f(s, u, e), as the
transition from a state-action-exogenous triplet s, u, e ∈ S × U × Ξ to another
state s′ ∈ S. This decision process necessitates information on the REC mem-
bers, which are encapsulated in the set I = {1, . . . , I}, where i ∈ I denote a
generic REC member.
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Figure 2: Illustration of the decision process described in the problem statement
at a given time step t which corresponds to the end of a metering period.
3.1.1 Discretisation of the time horizon
The time horizon constituting the dynamical system is split into discrete time
steps 0, . . . , t, . . . , T − 1. In our dynamical system we define a metering period
as the interval ]t, t+ ∆M ] where ∆M ∈ R+. Moreover, we can define a sub-
metering period as the interval ]t, t+ 1] where each interval’s resolution is ∆C
(e.g., 15 minutes). We assume that control actions are applied to the control-
lable assets at each discrete time step t and that repartition keys are computed
every ∆M > 1 discrete time steps. We further assume that T does always cor-
respond to the end of a metering period and that at each discrete time step t,
the consumption and the production of each member, which is measured during
the sub-metering period ]t, t+ 1], is added to the current consumption and pro-
duction of the metering period to which the discrete time step t belongs. Figure
2 illustrates this time horizon.
3.1.2 State space
Every state s ∈ S comprises information for each REC member i ∈ I concerning
(i) the controllable assets (e.g., state of charge of the battery) represented by
sci ; (ii) the electricity consumed during a metering period, represented by s
e−
i ;
(iii) the electricity produced during a metering period, represented by s
e+
i , and
(iv) the number of discrete time steps elapsed in the current metering period,






















Every action u ∈ U contains (i) the actions that can be applied to the con-
trollable assets of each member i ∈ I, represented by uci , and (ii) the export
key and the import key, represented by uk+ and uk− , respectively. These keys




Every exogenous variables et ∈ Ξ at each discrete time step t contains (i) a vector
of buying prices ebi,t (e.g., retail price) for member i in the metering period
to which the interval ]t, t+ 1] belongs, (ii) a vector of selling prices esi,t > 0
(e.g., selling price to retailer) for member i in the metering period to which
the interval ]t, t+ 1] belongs, and (iii) other exogenous variables associated to
each member of the community eoi,t (e.g., PV production), for all i ∈ I. For
compactness, we can define these vectors as eb =
(




, es = (es1, . . . , e
s
N ),
and eo = (eo1, . . . , e
o
N ).
3.1.5 Repartition keys on sub-metering periods
Repartition keys are only computed at the end of a metering period, i.e., when
sτ = ∆M . In this case, the export keys u
k+ and the import keys uk− are I-
dimensional vectors whose values stand in the interval [0, 1]. Moreover the sum
of all the components of uk− are equal to 1. When sτ 6= 0 –in other words, when
the current time step t does not correspond to the end of a metering period–
the import keys uk+ and the export keys uk+ are both set to ∅, which are values
that have no effect on the decision process.
3.1.6 Local production surplus
The local production surplus to be shared among the REC members is denoted







The fraction of this local production surplus allocated to member i is defined
by uk− [i]Φ. From these definitions, for every member i ∈ I, the electricity
consumption not covered by local production and the production exported to
the main utility grid at the end of a metering period are s
e−
i − uk− [i]Φ and
(1− uk+ [i])se+i , respectively.
3.1.7 Constraints on the action space
We assume that the set of admissible actions that can be taken given the current
state and the current exogenous variable is given by the mapping U : S × Ξ → P(U).
This mapping can be built according to the following structure:
U(s, e) ⊆

{[(uc1, . . . , ucN ), ∅, ∅] ∈ U} if sτt 6= ∆M , otherwise
[








uk+ [i], uk− [i] ∈ [0, 1] and∑
i∈I
uk− [i] = 1 and
uk− [i]Φ 6 se−i




The constraints imposed on the import keys ensure that the fraction of the
local production surplus reallocated to a member cannot excess its consumption.
3.1.8 Net electricity consumption and production in a sub-metering
period
The net electricity production or consumption is the amount of power injected
or withdrawn to or from the grid during a given sub-metering period, and are
denoted by l+i,t ∈ R+ and l
−
i,t ∈ R+ respectively. These values may be the
realisation of any unknown, complex dynamics and may depend on the control
actions uci,t, for all i ∈ I. Later in this paper, we will assume that at each
discrete time step t, the pair (l+i,t, l
−
i,t) is the result from a known function of the
state sci,t, action u
c
i,t and exogenous variable e
o
i,t for all i ∈ I.
3.1.9 Transition dynamics
We assume the following known discrete-time transition dynamics for the state









i,t)|sci,0 = Sci,0,∀i ∈ I, (3)
sτt+1 = f
τ (sτt ) =
{
sτt + 1 if (s
τ
t + 1) (mod ∆M ) 6= 0
0 otherwise




































∣∣∣∣ se−i,0 = 0,∀i ∈ I, (6)
where Sci,0 is the value of the initial state s
c
i,0.
In this transition, Equation 3 represents the transition dynamics of the con-
trollable assets of the members. Equation 4 represents the transition dynamics
of the number of time steps elapsed in the current metering period. Equa-
tion 5 represents the transition dynamics of the electricity production during
the current metering period. Finally, Equation 6 represents the transition dy-
namics of the electricity consumption during the current metering period. For
compactness, we can define the function f :











































Note that the definition of f ci must be provided for all i ∈ I for a full
definition of the decision process.
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3.1.10 Cost functions
We assume the following known instantaneous cost function ρ : S×U×Ξ×S →
R, for all t > 0:









































where ρoi (st, ut, et, st+1) is the sum of operational costs related to member i for












t ) is the cost of the electricity
bill, sent by the retailer, which depends on the repartition keys for the discrete
time step t that corresponds to the end of a metering period.
3.2 Optimal policy search
A mapping from a given state and exogenous space to an action space is known
as a policy. In this subsection, we define (i) the structure of the policies as well
as how to evaluate their performances; and (ii) the objective function to define
the set of optimal policies.
3.2.1 Formal definition and evaluation of policies
We assume that the dynamics of the exogenous variables may not follow a
Markov Decision Process (i.e., the value at t+ 1 cannot be predicted given the
value at t). Then, we can define a policy π as a mapping from a state and
a history of exogenous variables to an action. Accordingly, the entire set of
admissible policies Π can be defined as:
Π =
{
π : S ×HΞ → U | π(s, (e0, . . . , et)) ∈ U(s, et),






t is the set of all possible histories of exogenous vari-
ables of the form (e0, . . . , et−1) ∈ Ξt for all t ∈ [0, . . . , T ].
Given a trajectory of length T , and having access to the realisation of ex-
ogenous variables ET ∈ ΞT , we can determine the cumulative cost C of a policy
π as the sum of the observed costs at every time step t of such a trajectory:




ρ(st, π(st, Et), et, st+1)
∣∣∣ (8)








3.2.2 Searching optimal policies
To find the optimal policy we must first find an appropriate function represent-
ing the expected return of the policy, that is, an objective functionObjfootnoteThe
objective function might be a different one (e.g., expected value at risk). How-
ever, we focus on the expected return of the policy because (i) we only optimise
over this objective function in the simulations results, and (ii) we aim to keep
a reasonable complexity over the problem statement.. This objective function
requires information concerning the value of the initial state sci,0, which is as-
sumed to be sampled according to a probability distribution P ci,0(·). Likewise,
the objective function requires the realisation of the sequences of exogenous vari-
ables ET of size T – this is assumed to be sampled according to a probability
distribution PΞT (·).







C(s0, ET−1, π) . (9)
The goal is then to find an optimal policy π∗ such that
π∗ ∈ arg min
π∈Π
Obj(C, π, PΞT , P
c
i,0) . (10)
However, since PΞT and P
c
i,0 are not known, the computation of Equation (10)
is not possible in practice. In the next section (Section 4), we propose three
policies, based on the optimal one introduced in Equation (9), that can be
applied in practice by predicting the future values of the exogenous variables.
In Section 5, these three policies are tested on an REC built from synthetic data
– that is, synthetic consumption and production profiles, as well as synthetic
structure. For simplicity, during these tests we assume that the predictions of
the values are perfect, to limit the complexity of these tests to a reasonable level.
Since this paper focuses on the impact of the joint optimisation of the flexible
assets and the repartition keys, the previous assumption does not impact on our
conclusions.
4 Policies for the control of RECs
In the previous section, we have formalised the problem faced by an ECM to
find an optimal policy that minimises the electricity bills of the REC members,
given by Equation (10). To find this optimal policy, the distributions PΞT and
P ci,0 are needed, however, we do not know them. Without them, a policy has
only access to the current state st and exogenous variable et. This information
is enough to find a sequence of actions that minimises, at each time step, the
instantaneous cost function ρ (st, ut, et, st+1) However, this sequence of actions is
not equivalent to one that minimises the sum of the instantaneous cost function
over this time horizon, as described in Equation 9, and the performance of the
former in regards of this optimisation problem is worse than such of the latter.
Thus, in this section we set out to find a solution the outperforms the one
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obtained by minimising the instantaneous cost function and yet can be applied
in real life. To that end, we describe three policies whose core principle is their
reliance on predictions of the exogenous variables at t+ 1, these predictions can
be provided by a forecasting algorithm.
The three policies introduced in this section compute open-loop sequences of
actions that minimise the objective function described in Equation (9). This is
done to find the next action to be applied to the dynamical system. The, assum-
ing that the policies have always access to the current state st and exogenous
variable et of the system, they perform the following steps:
1. prediction of the values of the future exogenous variables over a look-ahead
horizon K, to which we refer as policy horizon;
2. jointly optimise the sequence of control actions and the sequence of repar-
tition keys that minimise the sum of the costs ρ from the time step t to
t+K;
3. apply to the REC the first action of the sequence.
The first of our policies simply applies these three steps, we refer to this one
as the look-ahead policy. A shortcoming of this policy is that, the predicted
sequence of exogenous variables does not necessarily end up in a time step
that corresponds to the end of a metering period (i.e., t + K > t + ∆M ). In
consequence, electricity prices are predicted up to t + K, but only used up
to t + ∆M to compute the optimal actions. To overcome this problem and
potentially improve the solution, a second policy can compute virtual repartition
keys up to t + K, making use of all the available information. This is called
the look-ahead-billing policy. Finally, to compare our previous policies with
the case where no joint optimisation of control actions and repartition keys is
performed, a third policy has been created, namely the look-ahead decoupling
policy. This last policy only optimises the sequence of control actions, whereas
the repartition keys are set to zero (i.e., the local production surplus cannot be
allocated among the REC members). For this policy, the optimal repartition
keys are computed at the end of the simulation period whose time horizon is T ,
in an independent ex-post optimisation process aiming to minimise the objective
function, similar to [12].
4.1 Look-ahead policy
The first of the policies introduced in our work, the look-ahead policy, is formally
described in this section. We assume that this policy can predict exogenous vari-
ables up to a given time horizon K, denoted by policy horizon, êt+1, . . . , êT ′(t)
with 0 6 K << T and T ′(t) = min(t+K,T ). With these predictions, the policy
is able to compute an open-loop sequence of actions û∗t , . . . , û
∗
T ′(t) that minimises
the sum of costs
∑T ′(t)
t′=t ρ(st′ , û
∗
t′ , êt′ , st′+1) at each discrete time step t and to
apply the first action of this sequence. Any suboptimality of the sequence of ac-
tions û∗t , . . . , û
∗
T ′(t) will depend on the prediction error of the exogenous variable
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and the policy horizon K. Algorithm 1 presents this policy with a full definition
of the decision process and a policy horizon as inputs. Furthermore, Algorithm
2 illustrates the interactions between the policy and the REC.
Algorithm 1 Building look-ahead policy
1: function Build Look ahead policy(D, K)
2: Extract state space SD, action space UD, exogenous space ΞD, dynamics
function fD, instantaneous cost signal ρD and the function UD from D.
3: function Look ahead policy(sDt , e
D
t )
4: Predict êDt+1, . . . , ê
D























| sDt′+1 = fD(sDt′ , uDt′ , êDt′ ), uDt′ ∈ UD(sDt′ , êDt′ ),∀t 6 t′ 6 T ′(t)
}
.
6: Return the first action ûD,∗t .
7: Set policy ← Look ahead policy
8: Return policy.
Algorithm 2 REC control process with a given policy
1: procedure REC-control-process(T , s0, e0, policy)
2: Set t← 0.
3: Set C ← 0.
4: for t from 0 to T − 1 do
5: Compute ut ← policy(st, et).
6: Apply ut to st and observe st+1 and et+1 according to the dynamical
system.
7: Set C ← C + ρ(st, ut, et, st+1).
4.2 Look-ahead-billing policy
Improving upon the look-ahead policy, this section introduces the look-ahead
billing policy.
When using the look-ahead policy, the billing costs related to the repartition
keys for the last metering period may not be taken into account. Indeed, if
T ′(t) (see Algorithm 1) does not coincide with the end of a metering period
(t + ∆M ) for each t, the term ρ
e (costs related to the repartition keys at time
step T ′(t)) would not be included in the objective function.Then, the cost of
the electricity bill at T ′(t) cannot be taken into account to compute û∗t . In
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this situation, the actions û∗t may significantly differ from those which would be
computed by optimising the cost of the electricity bill including T ′(t) – we may
reasonably suppose that the actions û∗t computed taking into account a cost
related to the repartition keys at T ′(t) belongs may improve the quality of the
policy. Following this intuition, we introduce virtual repartition keys, denoted
by ak− and ak+ , which follow the same constraints are uk− and uk+ as described
in Section 3. These virtual repartition keys are introduced as decision variables
in the optimisation problem solved by the look-ahead policy, whenever the last
time step does not correspond to the end of a metering period. Moreover, an
extra term ρe can be added to the objective function, depending on these new
virtual repartition keys. The new optimisation problem then becomes:
û∗t , . . . , û
∗


















Algorithm 3 builds this new policy with a full definition of the decision
process and a policy horizon as inputs. Later in the simulation, we will show
and discuss the performances of the two policies on different scenarios.
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Algorithm 3 Building look-ahead-billing policy
1: function Build look ahead billing policy(D, K)
2: Extract state space SD, action space UD, exogenous space ΞD, dynamics
function fD, instantaneous cost signal ρD and the function UD from D.
3: function Look ahead billing policy(sDt , e
D
t )
4: Predict êDt+1, . . . , ê
D





5: if T ′(t) is not a multiple of ∆M then
6: Compute
























T ′(t) , s
e+,D
T ′(t) , a
k+ , ak− , êD,bT ′(t), ê
D,s
T ′(t))






















| sDt′+1 = fD(sDt′ , uDt′ , êDt′ ), uDt′ ∈ UD(sDt , êDt ), ∀t 6 t′ 6 T ′(t)
}
.
9: return the first action ûD,∗t .
10: Set policy ← Look ahead billing policy.
11: Return policy
4.3 Look-ahead-decoupling policy
Depending on the complexity of the optimisation problem to be solved at each
discrete time step –especially when K is rather large– the computation time
needed for the look-ahead and look-ahead-billing policies might not be compat-
ible with real-time constraints of the control actions. Indeed, these two policies
jointly optimise both control actions and repartition keys, and this optimisation
procedure bears more complexity than optimising only the control actions. If
computational constraints are an issue, the two optimisations can be decoupled
so that first the control actions are optimised and then, based on them, an ex-
post optimisation of the repartition keys can be performed, in a similar fashion
as in [12]. This optimising procedure is computationally less expensive at the
expense of the quality of the solution, a trade-off between them emerges that
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can only be assessed in a case-by-case analysis.
According to these principles, a new policy can be defined, namely the look-
ahead-decoupling policy. This policy requires the export key uk+ to be restricted
to zero during the computation of the sequence of actions. Then, given this
sequence of actions, the sequence of repartition keys are optimised. This policy
is inspired from [12] and adapted to our work. Algorithm 4 describes the look-
ahead-decoupling policy.
Algorithm 4 Building look-ahead-decoupling policy
1: function Build look ahead decoupling billing policy(D, K)
2: Extract state space SD, action space UD, exogenous space ΞD, dynamics
function fD, instantaneous cost signal ρD and the function UD from D.
3: function look-ahead-decoupling-policy(sDt , e
D
t )
4: Predict êDt+1, . . . , ê
D





5: Predicts êDt+1, . . . , ê
D
T ′(t).
6: Set U ′D(sD, eD)←
{














































11: Set policy ← Look ahead decoupling policy.
12: Return policy
4.4 Computing open-loop sequences of actions for the three
policies
To compute open-loop sequences of actions for each of the policies, we assume
that, at each discrete time step t, all the policies have access to the exogenous
variables et, . . . , eT ′(t) for all look-ahead horizons K ∈ N+ and for all time
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horizons T ∈ N+. Moreover, to encode this problem as a linear or mixed-integer
linear program, we need to linearise the transition dynamics, constraints and
cost functions. Then, the policies can exploit any available mixed-integer linear
program solver such as CPLEX [28] to compute open-loop sequences of actions
in a time receding horizon fashion during the control process of this REC. This
section presents the linearisations needed to encode and solve the problem with
such off-the-shelf solver.
Linearisation of the transition dynamics functions




0 if sτ 6= 0 ,
1 otherwise.
. (12)
Provided that Msτ is given as input in the optimisation problem to be solved
by the policies, the transition functions fe+ and fe+ can be transformed into


















i ,∀i ∈ I,∀s ∈ S. (14)
Linearisation of the constraints
Let us derive U ′ from U by replacing import and export keys uk− and uk+
by electricity imported from retailer u′r− , electricity exported to retailer u′r+ ,
electricity imported locally u′l− , and electricity exported locally u′l+ .
Let U ′ be the set of admissible actions, assumed to be built according to the
following structure:
U ′(s, e) ⊆

{[(uc1, . . . , ucN ), ∅, ∅] ∈ U} if sτt 6= 0{[


















,∀i ∈ I,∀(s, e) ∈ S × Ξ.
(15)
We then can replace the constraint described by Equation 24 by the following
constraints:
ur+ [6] = 0, (16)
ur− [6] = 0. (17)
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Linearisation of the whole cost function




0 if fτ (sτ ) 6= 0 ,
1 otherwise.
. (18)
Provided that Msτ is given as input in the optimisation problem to be solved
by the policies, the cost function ρ can be transformed into an equivalent linear
function as follows:


























5 Testing the Policies on a REC Decision Pro-
cess built from Synthetic Data
In this section, we test the three policies proposed in Section 4. To that end,
we employ various policy horizons and two different RECs (Cases I and II)
built from synthetic data, and inspired from a real case in the region of Méry,
Belgium.
The first REC include six members: four consumers, one producer based on
a solar photovoltaic (PV) installation, and an owner of a large lithium-ion bat-
tery. The latter is, therefore, the only controllable asset of the REC.The second
REC differs from the first one in that (i) the lithium-ion battery is replaced
by a long-term storage device with larger capacity but less power capacity, and
(ii) the PV producer also owns a small lithium-ion battery, suitable for short-
term storage. Hydrogen-based storage systems can be used as long-term storage
whereby relatively large amounts of energy can be economically stored since the
container is inexpensive. However, due to the high costs of electrolytes and
cells, their power is usually limited. On the other hand, lithium-ion batteries
are relatively expensive at high capacities, but they provide relatively inexpen-
sive input and output power, which make them good candidates for short-term
electricity storage. This second REC is similar to the set-up described in [18].
Finally, we display and discuss the results, particularly highlighting the dif-
ference in terms of performances between jointly optimising the controllable
assets and the repartition keys, and optimising only the controllable assets.
5.1 Description of Case I
5.1.1 Formal description of the decision process
This section completes the formulation of the decision process associated to the
first REC, composed of N = 6 members, where (i) 1, . . . , 4 are the indexes refer-
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ring to four consumers named C1, . . . , C4, respectively, (ii) the 5− th member
is a PV producer, and (iii) the 6-th member is a battery owner who does not
consume or produce electricity via non-controllable assets.
Discretisation of the time horizon
We assume that ∆C = 0.25, i.e., that each time interval (t, t + 1] lasts 15
minutes. We also assume that ∆M = 0.25, i.e., that a metering period lasts 1
hour. We set T = 720, which corresponds to 7.5 days.
State space
The state sci for members i ∈ {1, . . . , 5} is represented by an empty state
s∅. The state sc6 ∈ R+ is the state of charge of the battery of the member 6,
expressed in kWh.
Action space
The action uci for members i ∈ {1, . . . , 5} is represented by an empty action




6 ), is a pair of charge/discharge
commands of the battery owned by the member 6, both expressed in kW.
Exogenous space
The exogenous variable eot,i ∈ R+ is the amount of energy consumed by the
non-controllable assets of member i at time step t expressed in kWh, for all
members i ∈ I and for all time steps t = 0, 1, . . . , T . The exogenous variable
eot,5, for all time steps t = 0, 1, . . . , T , corresponds to the amount of energy
produced by the solar photovoltaic installation of member 5 at time step t. The
consumption profiles of members 1, . . . , 4 and the production profile of member
5 are built from real consumption data and are available on demand. Member 6
do not consume or produce energy via non-controllable assets, i.e., that eot,6 = 0
for all time steps t = 0, 1, . . . , T .
The exogenous variables related to the price vectors of buying electricity for




where erbi ∈ R+ is the retailer buying
price for the member i expressed in EUR/kWh. The exogenous variables related
to the price vectors of selling electricity for all members i ∈ I are defined as
esi = [e
rs
i ] where e
rs
i ∈ R+ is the retailer selling price for the member i expressed
in EUR/kWh. Buying retail prices erbi,t for members i ∈ {1, . . . , 4} and selling
retail price ers5,t for member 5 are detailed in Section 5.1.2 for all discrete time
steps t = 0, 1, . . . , T . Retail buying price ers5,t for member 5 is equals to 0 for
all discrete time steps t = 0, 1, . . . , T . Retail buying price erb6,t and retail selling
price ers6,t for member 6 are equal to 0 for all discrete time steps t = 0, 1, . . . , T .
Constraints on the action space
The set of admissible actions U(s, e) for all pairs of states and exogenous


















s−6 − uk− [6]Φ = 0, (24)





6 are lower and upper bounds of the state of charge of the





lower and upper bounds of the charge and discharge commands of the battery
of member 6 expressed in kW , respectively. Equations 20 and 21 specify the
upper and lower limits of the state of charge of the battery of the member 6,
respectively. Equations 22 and 23 specify the upper limits of the charge and
discharge commands of the battery of the member 6, respectively. Equations
24 and 25 disallow the energy exchanges between the battery of the member 6
and the main network when sτ = ∆M .
Net electricity consumption/production in a sub-metering period
The transition dynamics of l+i and l
−




eoi,t if i ∈ {1, . . . , 5} ,
∆Cu
c−
i,t if i = 6,
0 otherwise.
,∀i ∈ I,∀0 6 t < T. (26)
l−i,t =

eoi,t if i ∈ {1, . . . , 5} ,
∆Cu
c+
i,t if i = 6,
0 otherwise,
,∀i ∈ I,∀0 6 t < T. (27)
Equation 26 specifies the net electricity production of each member, which
correspond to non-controllable production assets of members 1, . . . , 5 and energy
discharged from the battery of the member 6. Equation 27 specifies the net
electricity consumption of each member, which correspond to non-controllable
consumption assets of members 1, . . . , 5 and energy discharged from the battery
of the member 6.
Transition dynamics
Transition dynamics specific to controllable assets f ci for members i ∈ I - in
particular the charging/discharging dynamics of the battery of the member 6 -
















) if i = 6,
sci otherwise.
,∀i ∈ I,
where η+i is the charging efficiency of the battery and η
−
i is the discharging
efficiency of the battery.
Cost functions













i ) if i = 6,
0 otherwise.
,∀i ∈ I,
where ε = 10−6. This cost function is a small penalty on the discharge com-
mand of the battery so as to introduce a mutual exclusion between charge and
discharge commands without introducing binary constraints, which increases
the complexity of the optimisation problem.
The cost of the electricity bill depending on the repartition keys ρe is defined
as:












5.1.2 Values from synthetic data for Case I
The sequences of exogenous variables related to the energy buying prices from
retailers erbi and to the energy selling prices to retailers e
rs
i for all members
i ∈ I, expressed in Eur/kWh, are also built from synthetic pricing plans:
erb1 =
{
























The values for parameters described in Section 5.1.1 and initial states are:
Sc6,0 = 300kWh, (29)
η+6 = 88%, (30)
η−6 = 88%, (31)
S
bcc
6 = 40kWh, (32)
S
dce
6 = 160kWh, (33)
U
dc+e
6 = 176kW, (34)
U
dc−e
6 = 352kW. (35)
5.1.3 Computing open-loop sequences of actions for each policy
The linearisation of the generic optimisation problem described in Section 4.4
applies here. We describe below the linearisation of the electricity bill function
described in Section 5.1.1.
Linearisation of the cost of the electricity bill
Using the previously defined import and export vectors u′− and u′+ indexed
by I, the cost of the electricity bill defined by Equation 28 can be transformed
into an equivalent linear function as follows:
ρe(se− , se+ , u′r− , u′r+ , u′l− , u′l+ , eb, es) =
∑
i∈I
u′r− [i]erbi − u′r+ [i]ersi . (36)
5.1.4 Testing the Policies for Case I and Discussion on Results
The three policies discussed in Section 4 are tested in this section for the first
REC (case I) with varying policy horizons K ∈ {1, 12, 24, 36, 48}. More specif-
ically, we compare the results of the look-ahead and look-ahead-billing policies,
which jointly optimise controllable assets and repartition keys over the policy
horizon K, against the optimal policy –equivalent to look-ahead with K = 720
and perfect information concerning all exogenous variables– and the look-ahead-
decoupling policy which only optimises the controllable assets over the policy
horizon K. Table 2 shows the results of this test.
The sum of the electricity bills of the members obtained by using the look-
ahead policy with the policy horizon K = 12 is close to the one obtained using
the optimal policy – the difference being less than 30 EUR, and this difference
decreases as K grows. At K = 48, the difference with the optimal policy is less
than 0.05 EUR. These results suggest that near-optimal open-loop sequences of
actions can be computed with the look-ahead policy with a rather small policy
horizon, provided that the prediction error on the exogenous variables is low.
The sum of the electricity bills of the members obtained by using the look-
ahead-billing policy with the policy horizon K = 12 is lower than the look-ahead
policy (by around 1 EUR). As in the previous policy, as K grows, its sub-
optimality decreases. The lower costs using the second policy are consistent
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Policy K Total C1 C2 C3 C4 P
optimal N/A 651.75* 157.27 250.25 154.65 220.81 −131.23
look-ahead 12 683.09 163.62 256.11 156.96 237.09 −130.69
18 681.91 163.52 255.66 156.85 236.22 −130.33
24 671.96 161.82 254.04 155.34 231.63 −130.86
36 662.45 159.81 253.03 154.81 225.77 −130.98
48 651.8 157.27 250.33 154.65 220.81 −131.27
look-ahead-
billing
12 682.39 163.64 255.92 157.0 236.55 −130.73
18 677.85 162.92 255.0 156.2 234.54 −130.81
24 673.01 162.06 254.12 155.39 232.29 −130.85
36 662.29 159.68 253.13 154.83 225.61 −130.96
48 654.05 157.92 251.37 154.65 221.14 −131.04
look-ahead-
decoupling
12 854.91 180.46 302.24 199.86 268.96 −96.61
18 854.91 180.46 302.24 199.86 268.96 −96.61
24 854.91 180.46 302.24 199.86 268.96 −96.61
36 854.91 180.46 302.24 199.86 268.96 −96.61
48 854.91 180.46 302.24 199.86 268.96 −96.61
Table 2: Cost of the electricity bill in total and for each member by testing the
three policies with several policy horizons for the first REC, compared with the
optimal policy (equivalent to the look-ahead policy with K = T = 720).
across the different values of K. This suggests that introducing a virtual metering
period at the time step corresponding to the policy horizon at optimisation stage
might help improve the quality of the optimised open-loop sequences of actions.
Regardless of the policy horizon K, the sum of the electricity bills of the
members obtained by using the look-ahead-decoupling policy is significantly
higher than the one obtained using the optimal policy (by around 200 EUR).
Since this cost is also significantly higher compared to the other policies within
the same REC configuration, it clearly shows the importance, for any efficient
open-loop policy, of computing sequences of actions by jointly optimising the
controllable assets and the repartition keys through the control process of a
REC.
To better understand the difference in terms of the sum of the electricity bills
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of the members across the policies, Figure 2 shows the evolution of the state
of charge of the battery of the member 6. We notice that, while the optimal
policy and the look-ahead policy make use of the battery of Member 6 the look-
ahead-decoupling policy does not use it at all. This is expected since this policy
could never compute the repartition keys so as to charge/discharge the battery
through the community, as it could not set the import and the export keys to
other value than 0 (as per the definition of this policy).
Results also report the individual electricity bills. Note that repartition
keys implicitly define a rule to redistribute the global electricity bill among
the members. At the end of each metering period, the look-ahead policy, look-
ahead-billing policy and the optimal policy redistribute the local production
surplus generated by Members 5 and 6 to the others members. The way they
redistribute it depends on their consumption profiles and their retailer tariffs.
Indeed, according to Equation 28, the import keys allocated to members with
higher retailer tariffs should be higher than the others, following a global min-
imisation criterion of the sum of the electricity bills.
5.2 Description of Case II
5.2.1 Formal description of the decision process
This section defines the decision process associated to the second REC (case II),
which only differs from the first one in that Member 5 of the REC (i.e., the solar-
based electricity producer) owns a small battery, and that the configuration of
the battery of Member 6 differs in terms of capacity, power and energy efficiency.
For the sake of compactness, we rather describe here the components of the
decision process associated to this second REC that differs from the first one.
State space
The state sc5 ∈ R+ is the state of charge of the battery of Member 5, ex-
pressed in kWh.
Action space




5 ), is a pair of charge/discharge
commands of the battery owned by Member 5, both expressed in kW.
Constraints on the action space
The set of admissible actions U(s, e) for all pairs of states and exogenous
variables (s, e) ∈ S×E is the union of the set of constraints defined by Equations























5 are lower and upper bounds of the state of charge of the





lower and upper bounds of the charge and discharge commands of the battery
of member 5 expressed in kW , respectively. Equations 37 and 38 specify the
upper and lower limits of the state of charge of the battery of the member 5,
respectively. Equations 39 and 40 specify the upper limits of the charge and
discharge commands of the battery of the member 5, respectively. Equations
41 prevents the member 5 from buying energy from the main network when
sτ = ∆M .
Equation 24 can be linearised with the procedure explained in Section ??.
Net electricity consumption/production in a sub-metering period
The transition dynamics l+i and l
−






i if i = 5,
∆Cu
c−
i if i = 6,
0 otherwise.





i if i ∈ {1, . . . , 4} ,
∆Cu
c+
i if i = 6,
0 otherwise.
,∀i ∈ I,∀0 6 t < T.
Transition dynamics
















) if i ∈ {5, 6} ,
sci otherwise.
,∀i ∈ I,
where η+i and η
−
i are the charging and discharging efficiencies of the battery,
respectively.
Cost functions













i if i ∈ {5, 6} ,
0 otherwise,
,∀i ∈ I,
where ε = 10−6.
5.2.2 Values from synthetic data for Case II
The values for parameters described in Section 5.1.1 and initial states are set
as follows:
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Sc5,0 = 37, (42)
η+5 = 0.99, (43)
η−5 = 0.99, (44)
S
bcc
5 = 15, (45)
S
dce
5 = 60, (46)
U
dc+e
5 = 37, (47)
U
dc−e
5 = 97, (48)
Sc6,0 = 250, (49)
η+6 = 0.83, (50)
η−6 = 0.83, (51)
S
bcc
6 = 100, (52)
S
dce
6 = 400, (53)
U
dc+e
6 = 441, (54)
U
dc−e
6 = 882. (55)
5.2.3 Testing the Policies for Case II and Discussion on Results
As in Section 5.1.4, we test the three policies discussed in Section 4 in the second
REC (case II) with varying policy horizons K ∈ {1, 12, 24, 36, 48}. Figure 3
shows the results of these tests.
The sum of the electricity bills of the members, obtained by using the look-
ahead policy with the policy horizon K = 12 is similar to the one obtained using
the optimal policy – the difference is less than 10 EUR, and this difference
decreases as K grows. At K = 48, the difference with the optimal policy is
less than 1 EUR. This corroborates that near-optimal open-loop sequences of
actions can be computed with the look-ahead policy with a rather small policy
horizon, provided that there is a low prediction error of the exogenous variables.
The sum of the electricity bills of the members, obtained by using the look-
ahead-billing policy with the policy horizon K = 12 is lower than the look-ahead
policy (around 1 EUR). As in the previous policy, as K grows, its sub-optimality
decreases. Indeed, the sum of the electricity bills of the members obtained by
using the look-ahead billing policy with the policy horizon K = 48 is lower than
such obtained through the look-ahead policy. It is also interesting to note that
across the values of K, the sum of the electricity bills obtained by the look-ahead
billing policy is lower than the one obtained by look-ahead policy, which validates
the hypothesis that the look-ahead billing policy can improve the quality of the
control actions compared to the look-ahead policy
Regardless of the policy horizon K, the sum of the electricity bills of the
members obtained by using the look-ahead-decoupling policy is significantly
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Policy K Total C1 C2 C3 C4 P
optimal N/A 513.34* 153.48 242.34 150.18 216.98 −249.63
look-ahead 12 522.46 154.42 245.94 157.07 217.06 −252.02
18 518.43 154.42 243.77 153.85 217.06 −250.67
24 516.11 154.21 243.26 152.24 217.03 −250.64
36 515.15 154.16 243.23 151.23 217.02 −250.49
48 514.62 154.01 243.14 150.76 216.99 −250.28
look-ahead-
billing
12 521.34 154.42 244.93 156.55 217.06 −251.62
18 518.6 154.42 243.69 153.94 217.06 −250.51
24 516.62 154.21 243.29 152.67 217.03 −250.58
36 515.15 154.16 243.23 151.23 217.02 −250.5
48 514.81 154.01 243.14 151.02 216.99 −250.36
look-ahead-
decoupling
12 570.82 157.05 263.12 166.43 217.08 −232.86
18 570.82 157.05 263.12 166.43 217.08 −232.86
24 570.82 157.05 263.12 166.43 217.08 −232.86
36 570.82 157.05 263.12 166.43 217.08 −232.86
48 570.82 157.05 263.12 166.43 217.08 −232.86
Table 3: Cost of the electricity bill in total and for each member by testing the
three policies with several policy horizons for the second REC, compared with
the optimal policy (equivalent to the look-ahead policy with K = T = 720).
higher than the one obtained using the optimal policy (by around than 50
EUR).
To better understand the difference in terms of the sum of the electricity
bills of the members across the policies, Figure 2 shows the evolution of the
state of charge of the battery of Member 6. As in the first REC, we notice that
the look-ahead-decoupling policy does not use it at all, unlike the two others
policies. However, the battery owned by Member 5 is also used by this policy,
and it is done in a different way as in the two other policies. The pattern of the
state of charge of the battery suggests that this battery discharges its energy to
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Figure 3: State of the battery and local electricity net consumption for Case
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Figure 4: State of the batteries and local electricity net consumption for Case
II. (a) optimal policy; (b) look-ahead policy (K=12); (c) look-ahead-decoupling
policy (K=12).
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6 Conclusion and Perspectives
In this paper, we have proposed a generic formulation of the decision process
associated to renewable energy communities, which allows to jointly optimize
the controllable assets of each member and the repartition keys used to allocate
the local production among the members in order to minimise the sum of their
electricity bills. We have proposed two policies that exploit both the structure
of the REC and the available predictions of the future production and con-
sumption of each member to perform this joint optimisation in a time receding
horizon. Furthermore, a third policy that only optimise the controllable assets is
proposed. We have tested these algorithms on two REC control problems built
from synthetic data with 6 members - 4 consumers, 1 producer and a central
battery. Our results highlight the importance of the joint optimisation of the
controllable assets and the repartition keys, as higher sums of electricity bills
have been observed for the third policy.
The contribution of this paper could be extended along several directions.
First, let us notice that the control policies we have proposed have been using
linear programming techniques since the dynamics and the cost functions asso-
ciated to the REC built from synthetic data were linear. It is often not the case
for real RECs. In such context, we could use more advanced techniques such as
non-linear programming techniques (e.g., interior point methods) in these open-
loop policies or even use closed-loop policies. Reinforcement learning techniques
[29], especially by exploiting the expressiveness of deep neural networks [27] [30]
[31], are excellent candidates to build these closed-loop policies, since these tech-
niques have successfully been tested on challenging control problems related to
microgrids and power systems [21] [32] [33].
Finally, the repartitions keys, introduced by the decision process developed in
Section 3, implicitly describe a mechanism to redistribute the revenues generated
from the REC, which corresponds to the difference between the sum of the
electricity bills without the REC and the sum of the electricity bills with the
REC. However, this redistribution is biased by the electricity tariff imposed
by the retailers to each member, while other factors that should influence in
another way this redistribution (e.g., investment participation of a member to
build the REC, subsides brought by some members) are ignored. An ex-post
procedure could be developed to propose others redistributions schemes, as to
better incentivize the members to join the RECs.
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avril 2017 - art. 2,” 2017.
[16] Service public de Wallonie, “Mai 2019 – Décret modifiant les décrets des
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